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This paper marshals a variety of evidence in considering the degree of equity in the 
U.S. government's treatment of children vis-a-vis adults, particularly the elderly.  We begin 
by showing that poverty rates among American children have increased dramatically over 
the past two decades, while those of the elderly have fallen.  Next, we show that during 
the same period, consumption and income levels among the elderly have risen relative to 
those of other Americans, including children. 
The paper then turns to the role of govemment policy in influencing these trends. 
First, we document the high level of transfer payments going to the elderly relative to 
children, even if educational expenditures on children are included. We then argue that 
such point-in-time comparisons are invalid because they fail to consider that at any given 
time, children and the elderly are at different stages of their life cycles.  Controlling for this 
fact requires an examination of the government's fiscal treatment of different generations 
over their entire lifetimes.  Thus, we present/project lifetime net tax rates for generations 
born since 1900 as well as for future generations.  The results indicate that,  given current 
policy, today's and tomorrow's children could wind up paying as much as 70 percent of 
their lifetime income to the government, while the current elderly will pay only about 25 
percent on average. Although the paper cautions that generational equity is in the eye of 
the beholder, the disparity reported here does considerable violence to the norms of 
generational fairness. 
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This paper examines the U.S. government's current and prospective fiscal 
treatment of American children from the perspective of transfer payments now being 
received and government services now being purchased on their behalf.  It also considers 
the benefits and services today's children will receive as well as the taxes they will pay in 
their adult years. 
In examining the transfer payments and services that the current generation of 
children will receive and the taxes they will pay over their lifetimes, we seek to answer the 
question, "Are today's children being treated equitably compared with other generations, 
particularly the current elderly?" Our  answer relies in part on a new method of comparing 
the lifetime net tax burdens (taxes paid less transfers received) of different generations. 
This method, called generational accounting, overcomes the Wiculty encountered with 
point-in-time comparisons between any two generations, namely, that each is at a different 
stage of the life cycle. 
To understand this problem, consider a country with a long-standing policy of 
financing transfer payments to children through taxes on the elderly. While a point-in- 
time, say time-t, comparison of  the treatment of children versus their elders would suggest 
that children are being treated relatively favorably, it ignores the fact that the time-t elderly 
received the same amount of transfers when they were children, and that the time-t 
children will pay the same amount of taxes as the time-t elderly when they are old.  Thus, 
from a lifetime perspective, the time-t children in this example are being treated neither 
better nor worse than the time-t elderly.  In contrast to current-flow accounting, 
generational accounting, when applied in this hypothetical setting, documents the equal 
lifetime treatment of the time-t children and elderly. It thus provides a useful tool for 
comparing the fiscal treatment of different generations despite their being at various stages 
of the life cycle. 
- 
l~ee  Kotlikoff (1992) and Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (199 1). 
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http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmSection I1 begins by pointing out that poverty rates among American children have 
increased steadily over the past two decades, while those of the elderly have fallen. The 
paper then documents the concomitant rise in the income and consumption levels of older 
generations relative to younger generations, including children. Finally, we look at the 
government's role in altering the living standards of children vis-h-vis the elderly.  Our 
results show that much of the current plight of America's youngest citizens is traceable not 
to a lack of government financial support, but to the breakup of the family unit, which has 
left almost one-quarter of the nation's children dependent on just one parent. 
While section II's discussion of demographics provides some perspective on the 
limits of government policy in determining the living standards of children, the question 
remains as to whether the government has offset or exacerbated the relative economic 
situation of today's children.  The rest of the paper considers this question from both a 
point-in-time and a lifetime perspective.  Section III examines the current flows of transfer 
payments and services being provided to children and compares them with those going to 
senior citizens.  Section IV presents the generational accounting approach to examining 
the lifetime net tax treatment of different generations. In particular, we compare the 
lifetime net tax  rates of each generation of males and females who were born or who will 
be bornh this century.  A generation's lifetime net tax  rate is defined as the ratio of its 
lifetime net tax  payment to its lifetime labor earnings.  Lifetime tax rates for different' 
generations are calculated based on a continuation of current fiscal policy as well as under 
alternative policies.  Section V summarizes the main findings of the paper and presents our 
conclusions. 
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A.  Poverty Rates among Children and the Elderly 
Nearly 13 million American children are currently living in p~verty.~  About 35 
percent of these children are black and at least 20 percent are Hispanic.  This translates 
into a child poverty rate of nearly one in five overall, two in five for black households, and 
more than one in three for Hispanic households. 
The 20 percent aggregate child-poverty rate, however, tells us only about the 
fraction of children who are poor at a particular point in time.  It does not indicate the 
percentage of those who were poor in the past or who will be poor in the future.  Since 
there is considerable mobility of children into and out of states of poverty, one can surmise 
that more than 20 percent of American children will experience one or more such spells 
before  reaching their eighteenth birthday. Indeed, calculations by Ellwood (1988), based 
on panel data, indicate that more than one-third of the children born around 1970 
experienced some years of poverty before reaching age 10. 
As figure 1  shows, childhood poverty has been increasing steadily over the last two 
decades. In 1970, only 15 percent of American children were classified as impoverished. 
By 1990, that figure had risen to 20 percent.  Over the same period, poverty rates 
declined among the elderly. In 1970, almost one-quarter of all Americans age 65 hd 
older were officially poor.  By 1990, that figure had fallen to 12  percent. 
2~overty-rate  figures are taken from U.S.  Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-60, 
No. 168 and earlier reports. 
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The difference in poverty trends between the young and old raises the question of 
equity in the government's treatment of children vis-A-vis the elderly.  However, other 
factors clearly seem to be at play, at least as regards higher child poverty rates.  One of the 
most important of these is the increase in the fraction of American children living with 
only one parent.  In 1989,73.1 percent of all U.S. children, including 67.0 percent of 
Hispanic children and 38.0 percent of black children, lived with both parents. The 
respective figures for 1970 were considerably higher at 85.2 percent, 77.7 percent, and 
5  8.5 per~ent.~  Not surprisingly, child poverty rates are much greater among single-parent 
households than in two-parent households.  Currently, almost 50 percent of children living 
with one parent are poor, compared to only 10 percent of those living in intact homes. All 
told, about two in every three poor children come from single-parent families. 
The increase in the fraction of  children living with only one parent can be traced to 
two factors:  the rising divorce rate and the increasing share of children born out of 
wedlock.  Today, close to 13 percent of Americans age 35 to 44 are divorced, up from 2.9 
percent in 1960.4 As a consequence, two children in five now grow up in broken homes.5 
Concern about children living in single-parent homes would be mitigated if the absent 
partner were a frequent visitor, but quite often this turns out not to be the case. 
According to a recent survey, almost one-quarter of divorced fathers had no contact with 
their children in the previous five years and another 20 percent had not seen their children 
during the preceding year.6 
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1991, table 70, p. 53. 
4~usiness  Week,  May 20, 1991, p. 76. 
5~ee  Jane E. Brody, "Children  of Divorce:  Steps to Help Can Hurt," The New York Times, July 23,1991. 
The 1989 Statistical Abstract of the United States (table 132, p. 87) indicates that in 1985,1.73 percent of 
all children age 18 or younger had parents who divorced that year.  The comparable percentage for 1970 
was 1.25 percent. 
6The survey, by Dr. Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., and his colleagues at the University of Pennsylvania, is 
cited in Brody (1991). See footnote 5. 
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even more dramatic than the increase in the divorce rate.  In 1970, just over 10 percent of 
children were born to unwed mothers.  By 1990, that figure had topped 25 percent -- an 
explosion that transcends race.  In the case of whites, the 1970 share of births to unwed 
mothers was 6 percent.  By 1988, that figure had tripled to 18 percent.  For blacks, the 
respective figures were 38 and 64 percent. 
C.  Recent Chan-  the Relative Cowuption  J~vels  of Different Ape Grow 
The increase in childhood poverty relative to that of adults is suggestive of a 
general deterioration in the living standards of children vis-a-vis their elders. However, 
the evidence is inconclusive for the simple reason that impoverished children are only a 
segment of the entire population of children.  One way to assess the overall change in the 
living standards of children relative to adults is to look at changes over time.  To do that, 
we look at age-consumption profiles, or the ratio of one agelsex group's average 
consumption to that of a reference group.  The reference group used here is 40-year-old 
males. 
The data sources employed in our analysis are the 1972-73 and 1987-90 Survey of 
Consumer Expenditures, issued by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The procedures used 
to form average consumption by age and sex for each of the survey periods are described 
in detail in Kotlikoff and Sabelhaus (1993).  Briefly, expenditures reported in the surveys 
were first benchmarked against the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) totals 
to adjust for under- or overreporting. Next,  each household's adjusted expenditures were 
distributed to individual household members, producing a data set consisting of individuals 
with particular consumption expenditures and particular characteristics. The third step 
involved averaging these consumption expenditures across all individuals of a particular 
age and sex to obtain the average consumption values for each age/sex category.  The last 
step entailed adding to these values the age- and sex-specific average amounts of 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmconsumption expenditures included in the NlPAs but excluded from the consumer 
expenditure surveys.  An example is health care expenditures by third-party.  insurers, 
including the government. 
Figures 2 and 3 present the calculated age-consumption profiles for 1972-73 and 
1987-90 for males and females, respectively.  Note that both figures show that in the late 
1980s, consumption by the elderly grew relative to that of other age groups, including 
children. Young adults -- those between the ages of 20 and 40 -- experienced a 
particularly marked decline in their relative levels of consumption. 
To obtain a quantitative sense of the amount by which children's consumption has 
fallen since the early 1970s relative to that of the elderly, consider the average 
consumption among all 10-year-olds versus that of  all  70-year-olds. In 1972-73, 
consumption among 10-year-olds averaged 37 percent of the average for 70-year-olds. 
By 1987-90, the corresponding level was only 31 percent, a 16  percent drop. 
D.  Recent Chan~es  in the Relative Incomes of Different Age Groups 
What explains the recent increase in the elderly's relative consumption? The 
answer is that over the past 20 years or so, this group's income has grown much more 
rapidly than that of any other age group.  Figure 4, reproduced from Boskin, Kotlikoff, 
and Knetter (1985), shows the age-income profiles for different age groups over the 
1968-84  period.  Specifically, it plots the ratio of the average income of households 
whose heads are in particular age groups divided by the average income of households 
whose heads are age 35-44. 
Note the sustained increase in the relative income of households age 65 and older 
over the period charted. In 1968, income per elderly household averaged 43 percent of 
income per household age 35-44.  In 1984, this figure was 52 percent, a 21 percent rise 
over 16 years.  This increase represents an even larger percentage -- 45 percent -- relative 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmto households age 25-34, since, as figure 4 shows, the latter experienced a drop in their 
income relative to the 35-44 age group. 
If anything, figure 4 is likely to understate the recent growth in the relative income 
of the elderly. The reason is that income as defined in the Bodsin study includes only 
labor earnings, property income, private pension income, welfare benefits, annuities, 
unemployment benefits, and Social Security. It does not include the imputed value of 
government-provided health care benefits, such as Medicare and Medicaid. 
Figure 5, also from the Boskin study, examines the source of older Americans' 
relative income growth.  First, it plots the shares of particular types of income received by 
the elderly between 1968 and 1984.  Second, it plots the ratio of particular types of 
income that elderly households received, on average, to the corresponding average for 
households age 35-44.  Note the rapid growth in the relative Social Security and property 
income of the elderly as well as the decline in their relative labor earnings.  The latter can 
be traced to the elderly's shrinking labor force participation over this period. 
111.  The Government's Treatment of Children Relative to Other Age Groups -- 
A Point-in-Time Perspective 
A.  Flows of Transfers and Taxes by Age and Sex 
The last section documented the decline over the last 20 years in the economic 
well-being of children relative to the elderly. This section asks whether the government 
(federal, state, and local) has offset or worsened that trend.  One way to approach this 
question is to consider the taxes paid and the direct transfers received by different age 
groups. 
To that end, tables 1  and 2 present these values for various age-sex groups for the 
years 1970 and 1990. The tables are constructed using cross-section profiles of relative 
transfer receipts and tax payments by age and sex in order to distribute aggregate transfers 
and taxes according to those two demographic characteristics.  As described in Auerbach, 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmGokhale, and Kotlikoff (1991), the cross-section profiles are obtained from various 
microdata sets, the most important of which is the Census Bureau's Survey of Income and 
Plan Participation. Values for both aggregate transfer receipts and tax payments are 
obtained from the NIPAs and include all federal, state, and local government taxes and 
transfers.  Hence, tables 1  and 2 provide a comprehensive picture of the gross payment 
flows that the government made to, and took from, different age-sex groups in 1970 and 
1990. 
Each of the tables reports, for selected age-sex groups, the group's averpge net 
payment, defined  as its average tax payment minus its average transfer receipt.  The tables 
also decompose average tax payments into average labor income tax payments, average 
capital income tax payments, average payroll tax payments, and average exciselsales tax 
payments.  Average transfer receipts are decomposed into average non-Medicare Social 
Security benefits (OASDI), average government-provided health care benefits (primarily 
Medicare and Medicaid), and average welfare benefits (primarily Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children, food stamps, unemployment insurance, and general relief).  All 
figures are reported in 1991 dollars.7 
If  one focuses solely on the transfer payments recorded in tables 1  and 2, one sees 
that older Americans have benefited much more than have children. For example, in 1970 
the average transfer payment made to 70-year-old women was $5,120, while the average 
payment to 10-year-old girls was $350.  In 1990, the comparable figures were $10,467 
and $410.  In 1970, the ratio of the average transfer payment to 70-year-old women to 
that of  10-year-old girls was 14.6.  By 1990, that figure had grown to 25.5. 
The elderly do, however, pay out much more in taxes than do children, even if one 
imputes sales and excise tax payments to children. For instance, in 1990 the average tax 
70ne aspect of the tables that may seem anomalous is the excise tax payments imputed to children.  These 
taxes represent the payment of sales and excise taxes on goods and services purchased for children by 
their parents.  Admittedly, a case could be made for imputing these payments to the parents. 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmpayment was $7,412 for 70-year-old women, but only $799 for 10-year-old girls.  If one 
subtracts these transfers from the taxes paid, the resulting net payment figures still show 
an enormous difference in the flow of income from the government to the elderly versus 
children. 
B.  Flows of Age-Related Government Services 
The flows of transfers and taxes just considered do not provide a complete picture 
of the annual flow of economic resources between the government and the private sector. 
The main omission is the flow of services provided directly by the government as a 
consequence of its purchases of goods and services.  These services are wide-ranging and 
include items such as the protection afforded by national defense spending, reduction of 
travel time and transportation costs arising fiom federal, state, and local road systems, 
provision of public education, and the general knowledge that has filtered down from the 
space program.  Unfortunately, with the exception of educational expenditures (which in 
the main benefit children), government purchases consist of public goods, whose 
advantages cannot be ascribed to particular generations or groups within generations. 
Be that as it may, educational expenditures are still worth considering because they 
are so large. In 1990, combined education purchases for elementary education by federal, 
state, and local governments totaled $220 billion in 199 1  dollars -- nearly equaling the 
amount spent on that year's total Social Security retirement and survivor benefits.  If  we 
divide that $220 billion by the 72.3 million children alive in 1990, we arrive at a per child 
educational expenditure level of $3,042,  which swamps the average level of transfer 
payments children received that year.  The comparable calculation for 1970 leads to an 
average educational expenditure of $1,785 per child (again measured in 1991 dollars). 
These figures indicate several things.  First, they show that educational 
expenditures far outweigh direct transfer payments as a means of providing assistance to 
children.  Second, they reveal that since 1970, there has been a dramatic increase (70 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmpercent) in real spending per elementary school-age child. Third, they indicate that even if 
one adds to current per-child transfer payments today's historically high real spending per 
child on education, the government's total payment flow to children is still considerably 
smaller than the per capita transfers received by the elderly.  This is true whether the 
calculations are net or gross of tax payments by the elderly. 
In sum, if one ignores the fact that children and the elderly are at different stages of 
their life cycles -- and thus can be expected to receive different treatment by the 
government -- one can make a strong case that children are getting the short end of the 
stick. 
IV.  The Government's Treatment of Children Relative to Other Age Groups -- 
A Lifetime Perspective 
While the flow figures are striking, ignoring the fact that children and the elderly 
are at different stages of  their life cycles seems  clearly inappropriate. Does it make sense, 
for example, to claim that the current elderly are being treated better than current children 
because they generally receive large Social Security benefits?  Such an assertion ignores, 
among other things, the fact that the current elderly did not receive much in the way of 
Social Security benefits when they were children, and that today's children will receive 
larger Social Security benefits when they are old. 
By controlling for the life cycle, generational accounts can help us to assess the 
true degree of generational equity underlying government policy.  Generational accounts 
indicate, in present value, the average net taxes that members of a generation can expect 
to pay over their remaining lives. The generational account at birth of a given cohort is 
particularly interesting, as it indicates the average present value of the net taxes the 
generation's members will pay to the government over their entire life spans.  Such lifetime 
accounts can be used to compare the government's treatment of different generations, 
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cycle are included. 
In discounting taxes and transfers back to the year a generation is born, lifetime 
generational accounts place a smaller weight on taxes paid and transfers received at later 
stages of  the life cycle.  This makes sense because a dollar of taxes paid in the future is 
less painful (in economic terms) than a dollar paid in the present, and a dollar of transfers 
received in the future is less valuable than a dollar received in the present.  In discounting 
each generation's life cycle of tax payments and transfer receipts back to age zero, lifetime 
generational accounts in effect produce a single lifetime net tax bill that each generation 
faces upon birth. 
B.  What Constitutes Generationally Equitable Fiscal Policv? 
In considering which cross-generation pattern of lifetime generational accounts 
constitutes equitable lifetime treatment of different generations, it may help to start by 
taking the simple case of  an economy in which all members of a given generation are 
identical, productivity and population growth rates are zero, and the government 
purchases no goods or services. In such a world, taxes and transfers would be used only 
to redistribute wealth across generations. What would an equitable lifetime treatment of 
different generations entail in such an economy? If  we interpret equity to mean treating 
each generation identically, then an equitable policy would require setting the lifetime 
generational accounts of each generation to zero. 
To understand this requirement, suppose, to the contrary, that the government 
decides to make the lifetime generational account of a particular generation negative, i.e., 
it wants to provide net transfers to a particular generation. Since this largess would have 
to be paid for by some other generations, the government's decision would necessitate 
making their lifetime generational accounts positive.  Consequently, only zero lifetime 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmgenerational accounts are consistent with equal treatment of  all generations given the 
circumstances we have assumed. 
This notion of equity -- that each cohort's lifetime generational account should 
equal zero -- carries over to the case in which both government purchases and 
productivity growth are zero, but there is positive population growth.  In this scenario, 
future generations are obviously more numerous, but setting each one's lifetime account to 
zero ensures that members of each generation will bear the same fiscal burden -- namely, 
zero. 
Now let's add government purchases to our hypothetical economy, but assume that 
these are of no value to any generation. In this case, equitable treatment would mandate 
setting each generation's lifetime account to the same positive value, where this amount is 
determined such that the present value of all lifetime generational accounts of all current 
and future generations pays for the present value of government purchases. 
Next take the case where government purchases do provide services of positive 
value to some earlier generations, but where all such purchases occurred in the past. 
Further, suppose that the generations who received these benefits were not required to pay 
for them.  This means that existing and future generations would have to pick up the tab.g 
Equity in this context again mandates setting each current and future generation's lifetime 
account equal to the same positive value -- once again the amount needed to pay off, in 
present value, the bill these generations inherit collectively. The same situation would 
arise if the bill bequeathed to current and future generations were not for past government 
services enjoyed by older generations, but rather for past net transfers made to them.9 
gThk bill might, for example, be presented to current and future  generations in the form of official 
government debt. 
gThe initiation of an unfunded "pay-as-you-go" Social Security system is one example of  a situation in 
which current and future  generations are forced to pay for tmufers to a previous generation, namely, the 
one that is old when the system is initiated. This start-up generation receives Social Security benefits 
without ever having paid Social Security taxes.  As a consequence, later generations are forced, when 
young, to make contributions to a system that provides them with less old-age income than they would 
have earned had they been free  to invest that money privately.  The lower-than-market rate of retum that 
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well as future generations. Here, equitable government policy would involve 1)  providing 
each generation with the same level of services, and 2) making each generation pay the 
same amount for these services (i.e., setting the lifetime accounts of all generations at the 
same positive amount needed to cover, in present value, the government's spending). 
Thus far, we have argued that generationally equitable fiscal policy entails equal 
lifetime accounts for all generations. But this prescription becomes less clear once we 
alter our assumptions to include positive productivity growth.  In this case, generations 
born in the future will have higher lifetime incomes than those currently alive. If 
government policy is intended to equalize the welfare of all generations, it must find a 
means to redistribute, on an ongoing basis, from as-yet unborn generations toward those 
currently alive.  As suggested above, the available mechanism is to set the lifetime 
accounts of earlier generations at lower values (not necessarily positive values) than those 
of later generations. As can easily be shown, such a policy requires the government to set 
successive generations' lifetime accounts equal to a larger and larger fraction of their 
lifetime incomes. In other words, the lifetime tax rate, or the ratio of a generation's 
lifetime account to the present value of the income it earns over its entire life span, must 
approach 100 percent asymptotically. lo 
While positive productivity growth coupled with the goal of equalizing each 
generation's after-tax lifetime income means that today's children should face higher 
lifetime tax rates than today's adults, including the current elderly, the goal of perfect 
equality of welfare across generations is not sacrosanct.  Society may view different 
intergenerational distributions of after-tax income as equitable, even though these do not 
- - 
Social Security pays on contributions is the means by which current and future generations are forced to 
pay for the free benefits received by the start-up generation of elderly. 
losuppose that each generation's income grows at rate g. Then the tax rate required to equalize the  after- 
tax lifetime incomes of each generation is 1 - [r/(r-g)] / (I+~)~,  where r is the rate of interest and t indexes 
the year the generation is born.  This formula assumes that a generation's income is independent of the tax 
rate it faces. 
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higher levels of productivity that future generations will enjoy as their natural inheritance. 
Under this view, equitable fiscal treatment of different generations requires each to pay the 
same share of its lifetime income to finance expenditures on public goods and services as 
well as past transfers to now-deceased generations.  Such equal proportional sdice 
means, of course, that each generation should face the same lifetime tax rate. 
C.  Lifetime Tax  Rates of Americans Born since 1900 
Ultimately, the cross-generational distribution of lifetime accounts that constitutes 
an equitable distribution is a value judgment that cannot be resolved by economists or any 
other social scientists. What economists can do is to help society think through its 
decision and to show what generational lifetime net tax policy is actually in place. 
Hopefully, the above discussion has contributed to accomplishing the first task.  The 
second task -- understanding actual U.S.  generational policy -- is addressed in table 3, 
which shows the lifetime net tax rates of generations of American males and females born 
since 1900. 
Lifetime net tax rates are defined here as a generation's lifetime generational 
account (the age-zero present value of the average net taxes its members pay in each year 
of their remaining life) divided by the present value of the generation's lifetime labor 
income.  As described in appendix I, section F of Budget Baselines, Historical Data, and 
Alternatives for the Future  (Office and Management and Budget [January 1993]), lifetime 
net tax rates are based on estimates of actual taxes paid and transfers received between 
1900 and 1991 as well as on projections of future taxes and transfers.ll  Lifetime income 
is defined as the present value of pre-tax lifetime labor income.  Ideally, one would include 
ll~his  part of the current paper draws heavily on that work, which was written by Alan J. Auerbach, 
Jagadeesh Gokhale, Laurence J.  Kotlikoff, and several OMB staff members.  The principal OMB author 
was Robert Kilpatrick. 
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that information is not available. 
The lifetime net tax rate for males begins at 17.8 percent for those born in 1900 
and rises to 33.9 percent for those born in 1991. The corresponding figures for females 
exhibit a quite different pattern.  For them, the rate starts at 35.3 percent, declines on 
average for about 50 years, then rises slightly, leaving a 1991 value of 32.8 percent.  The 
high initial rate for females can be traced to two factors.  First, the present value of labor 
earnings for women born in the early part of the century is low.  Second, in allocating 
taxes between the sexes, we attribute certain types equally to husbands and wives (excise 
taxes, for example). Hence, women born in the early 1900s have low lifetime incomes, 
but are imputed with relatively high tax payments.  For females born in the postwar 
period, the absolute size of their lifetime net tax bills is higher, but due to the increase in 
female labor force participation, so too is their lifetime labor income.  This explains why 
lifetime tax rates for females born in the postwar period are below those of women born 
around the turn of  the century. 
Since the allocation of taxes between husbands and wives within marriages is, 
admittedly, somewhat arbitrary, table 3 also reports lifetime net tax rates for males and 
females together, calculated as a weighted average of the net tax rate for each sex.  Note 
that in this case the average net tax rate rises significantly over time, from 21.5 percent for 
the generation born in 1900 to 33.5 percent for the generation born in 199  1. 
Table 3 also reports gross tax and transfer rates.  To calculate these, the present 
value of a generation's lifetime taxes (or transfers) is divided by the present value of its 
labor income.  This breakdown reveals the growth of  government transfer payments 
during this century.  The lifetime transfer rate for males and females taken together nearly 
quadrupled between 1900 and 1991, rising from 3.3 percent to 12.2 percent.  The increase 
was more rapid, in both relative and absolute terms, for those generations born before 
World War 11 than for those born afterward. 
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purchases, the gross tax  rate has also risen markedly in the past two decades.  This is in 
contrast to the net tax  rate, which has stayed fairly constant. The gross tax  rate for males 
and females together is 24.8 percent for the generation born in 1900  versus 45.8 percent 
for the generation born in 1991. 
if  '  Tax Rate of Future Generatio  D.  me  L  mme  Net  ns Based on Current-Semce~  .  .  . .  oiecQons of E~~&DP  Gene 
'1  .  .  rabons Net Tax Contnm 
The only figures in table 3 that have not yet been discussed are the lifetime net tax 
rates to be paid by future generations. These rates are derived assuming a current- 
services projection of the future fiscal treatment of existing generations.  Specifically, we 
add together the remaining (as opposed to lifetime) generational accounts of  all existing 
generations to arrive at the collective net tax contribution they will have to make to pay 
off the government's existing net debt (gross debt minus gross assets) as well as the 
present value of its future purchases.  By subtracting this contribution from the sum of the 
government's net debt and the present value of its purchases, we arrive at the present- 
value amount that future generations will have to pay collectively if current fiscal policies 
are maintained. 
We transform the aggregate present-value fiscal burden to be imposed on future 
generations into a per capita amount by factoring in projections of future population 
growth and then assuming that each person born in the future pays the same amount after 
adjustment for economic growth.  The growth adjustment assumes that, on average, 
members of each successive generation pay l+g times the average amount paid by 
members of the previous generation, where g  is the assumed rate of growth.  The amount 
future generations will pay over their lifetimes divided by their projected future lifetime 
income provides our estimate of their lifetime net tax  rate. 
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net over their remaining years or government purchases are reduced, future citizens will  be 
faced with lifetime net tax rates of 7 1  percent -- more than twice the rate projected for 
those born in 1991 (again based on current services).  Of course, the assumption that 
existing generations, including those born in 1991, will pay no more than the amount 
suggested by current-services projections is just that -- an assumption. It is made not 
because it mirrors reality, but rather to illustrate the extent of the imbalance in U.S. 
generational policy.  As we discuss in the next subsection, other assumptions about the 
evolution of future U.S.  fiscal policy, specifically those that place a larger burden on 
existing generations, lead to lower lifetime net tax rates for future generations, albeit at the 
price of higher rates for those currently living, particularly today's children. 
E.  Generational Accounting's Me-  about the Demee of Eauity in U.S, 
The figures in table 3 indicate that current American children will be burdened 
with much higher lifetime net tax rates than the current elderly.  The generation born in 
1991, for example, could face a 27 percent larger lifetime net tax rate than that facing 
Americans born in 1920. This projected discrepancy would be ~i~cantly  exacerbated 
by any change in U.S.  fiscal policy aimed at preventing future generations from paying 
more than 70 percent of their lifetime income to the government. 
Table 4 illustrates two such changes.  The first involves capping federal spending 
between 1993 and 2004 for all mandatory programs except Social Security and federal 
deposit insurance.  Medicare and Medicaid are the two programs that would see the 
largest cuts relative to their baseline, current-services projections.  The second policy is a 
surtax on the federal individual income tax that would extend over the same years as the 
cap and that would produce, on a year-by-year basis, the same federal deficit reduction. 
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generations. Under the mandatory cap, future Americans would pay only 41 percent of 
their lifetime income to the government; under the surtax, they would pay 46 percent. 
However, while both of these means of bringing U.S. generational policy into closer 
balance would be applauded by future generations, current generations would be less 
enthusiastic. Take the surtax, for example.  Children born in 1991 would be forced to pay 
40 percent of their lifetime earnings to the government, rather than 34 percent, the 
current-services figure.  The mandatory cap and surtax policies would also raise the 
lifetime net tax rate of today's elderly, although by much less, since the changes in net 
taxes during their remaining years are small when discounted back to the years these 
generations were born.  In the case of the surtax, there is a 53 percent difference in the 
lifetime net tax rates of children born in 1991 versus the generation born in 1920. 
Is it fair that today's children may have to hand over more than 40 percent of their 
lifetime income to the government, while their grandparents will end up paying just one- 
quarter of theirs?  The answer depends on several factors.  First, today's children will, it 
appears, receive more services in the form of educational expenditures and public goods 
over their lifetimes than did their elders.  Second, certain types of contributions made by 
today's elderly, such as their participation in World War I1 or their suffering through the 
Great Depression, are not factored into our analysis.  Consideration of these special 
contributions might suggest that a lower lifetime tax rate for the current elderly is in order. 
Third, the steep increase in lifetime tax rates may be justified to the extent that society's 
notion of generational equity entails equalizing the after-tax lifetime earnings of current 
and future generations. 
If, however, society's idea of generational fairness means extracting an equal 
proportional sacrifice from every generation, then the numbers in tables 3 and 4 must be 
viewed (ignoring differences in public goods and special contributions) as highly 
discomforting. They show a trajectory of U.S.  generational policy that will force today's 
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to).  And the picture for tomorrow's children is even bleaker. 
Regardless of how one views the numbers in tables 3 and 4, it is worth pointing 
out that they probably understate the generational differences in economic well-being 
generated by U.S. fiscal policy. The reason is that they do not take into account what 
economists call general equilibrium fleets on factor prices.  In adopting the generational 
policy identified in table 3, the U.S.  government has permitted earlier generations to 
consume more over their lifetimes than would otherwise have been the case.  The 
argument for this policy was that every dollar the government allowed these generations 
to keep meant another dollar available to finance additional consumption. By consuming 
more, however, these generations have also lowered total U.S.  saving (see Gokhale 
[1993]).  While there are certainly other factors at play in explaining the recent drop-off in 
U.S. saving rates, generational policy is surely a prime contributor.  The United States is 
now saving at record low rates.  In 1991, for example, Americans put away only 1.7 
percent of their earnings, dramatically lower than the almost 9 percent rate observed, on 
average, between 1950 and 1969. 
Lower saving means lower investment, which in turn means that the U.S. capital 
stock will grow at a slower rate than the work force.  Since labor productivity depends on 
the amount of capital available per worker, and since real U.S.  wages reflect the nation's 
labor productivity, the decline in saving is responsible for lowering real wage growth.  It is 
also responsible for raising the real return to capital, since it has made capital scarce 
relative to labor, the other factor of production.  Those who have been most harmed by 
slower real wage growth are today's young and middle-aged workers, who have seen their 
real hourly pay pick up very slowly over the past two decades. If  the low rate of U.S. 
saving continues, today's children will also experience minimal growth in their real wages 
once they enter the work force.  Since the late 1970s, on the other hand, the real return to 
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have been today's elderly, the primary holders of U.S. capital over the last 20 years. 
While simulation studies of stylized economies, such as Auerbach and Kotlikoff 
(1987),  have shown that policy-induced general equilibrium changes in factor prices occur 
slowly over time, they have also demonstrated that such changes can be of fitst-order 
importance in redistributing across generations.  Thus, if one were able to factor in these 
feedback effects reliably, the difference in the treatment of today's elderly versus today's 
children would likely be greatly accentuated. 
V.  Conclusion 
This paper has examined a variety of  evidence, all of which points to a deterioration in 
the standard of living of American children relative to adults, particularly the current 
elderly. Our findings indicate a rapid increase in the lifetime net tax  rates of Americans 
born over the course of this century.  Those born at the turn of the century can expect to 
pay just over a fifth of their lifetime income to the government; for those born at the 
beginning of the next century, that figure is likely to swell to well over one-half. 
Does this considerable disparity in the lifetime net tax  rates of different generations 
imply that U.S. fiscal policy is generationally unsound? The answer depends on society's 
notion of generational equity, on how the special contributions of particular generations 
are assessed, and on the level of benefits being provided to different generations as a result 
of the government's purchases of goods and services. If  society believes that generational 
equity entails, other things being equal, the same proportional net tax sacrifice  from each 
generation, then there is no question that the federal government's treatment of today's and 
tomorrow's children relative to the current elderly is highly inequitable. 
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Tax Pavments  Transfer Receipts 
Labor  Capital  Payroll  Excise 
Income  Income  Taxes  Taxes  OASDIa  Health  Welfare 
0  0  0  3  03  5  47  298 
0  0  0  407  48  22  280 
0  0  0  513  110  2 1  220 
0  0  0  672  225  44  188 
1,204  95  915  1,502  103  44  175 
3,996  1,562  3,038  2,327  34  146  325 
4,382  4,170  3,331  2,299  79  146  299 
4,016  6,645  3,053  2,523  175  147  288 
3,100  7,621  2,357  2,411  398  147  258 
581  6,547  442  1,771  4,369  1,177  223 
124  4,590  94  1,312  4,490  1,591  255 
0  4,073  0  1,342  3,219  1,721  5 
Females 
Tax Payments  Transfer Receipts 
Labor  Capital  Payroll  Excise 
Income  Income  Taxes  Taxes  OASDIa  Health  Welfare 
0  0  0  301  5  42  3  73 
0  0  0  409  48  19  29  1 
0  0  0  5  18  109  17  224 
0  0  0  676  223  43  218 
789  0  600  1,391  99  43  344 
847  290  644  2,071  26  58  4 17 
1,004  1,346  763  2,035  69  58  316 
1,138  2,607  865  2,392  129  121  201 
922  3,465  70  1  2,2  10  369  121  136 
160  3,490  121  1,954  3,840  1,160  120 
32  2,669  25  1,616  3,269  1,594  128 
0  27  1  0  1,567  2,025  1,767  129 
aOld-age and survivors disability insurance. 
Source:  Authors' calculations. 
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Tax Payments  Transfer Receipts 
Labor  Capital  Payroll  Excise 
Income  Income  Taxes  Taxes  OASDIa  Health  Welfare 
0  0  0  460  5  160  2  8  3 
0  0  0  565  57  77  265 
0  0  0  750  139  7  1  209 
0  0  0  1,044  289  151  193 
1,204  133  1,317  1,712  12  151  2  17 
4,080  2,176  4,463  2,353  75  495  420 
5,386  5,808  5,890  2,648  181  495  400 
5,357  9,256  5,858  2,932  330  496  382 
3,558  10,616  3,891  2,838  795  496  374 
5  15  9,l 19  564  2,563  7,725  3,68 1  3  93 
177  6,393  194  2,206  7,797  4,973  445 
0  5,673  0  1,659  6,297  5,387  2  1 
Females 
Tax Payments  Transfer Receipts 
Labor  Capital  Payroll  Excise 
Income  Income  Taxes  Taxes  OASDIa  Health  Welfare 
0  0  0  444  5  143  354 
0  0  0  595  57  66  276 
0  0  0  799  139  58  2  13 
0  0  0  1,050  288  146  207 
870  0  952  1,561  11  146  528 
2,178  405  2,382  2,075  50  197  694 
2,464  1,875  2,695  2,451  116  197  52  1 
2,028  3,632  2,218  2,760  166  408  319 
1,259  4,826  1,377  2,579  65  8  408  2  17 
167  4,862  182  2,201  6,625  3,622  220 
52  3,717  57  1,685  6,502  4,985  23  3 
0  377  0  1,574  5,442  5,545  237 
aOld-age and survivors disability insurance. 
Source:  Authors' calculations. 
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Net  Gross  Gross 
Tax  Tax  Transfer 
Rate  Rate  Rate 
17.8  19.6  1.8 
21.8  24.6  2.8 
24.2  27.7  3.5 
26.4  30.5  4.1 
28.2  33.0  4.8 
30.6  36.8  6.2 
32.3  39.6  7.2 
33.6  41.7  8.1 
34.1  42.4  8.3 
33.9  42.7  8.7 
33.9  42.7  8.8 
Females 
Net  Gross  Gross 
Tax  Tax  Transfer 
Rate  Rate  Rate 
35.3  43.9  8.7 
35.7  49.6  13.9 
34.0  50.4  16.5 
34.4  52.8  18.5 
32.7  50.6  17.9 
30.6  46.9  16.3 
31.5  47.9  16.4 
32.5  50.3  17.8 
33.1  51.6  18.5 
32.9  52.0  19.1 
32.8  52.0  19.2 
Males & Females 
Combined 
Net  Gross  Gross 
Tax  Tax  Transfer 
Rate  Rate  Rate 
21.5  24.8  3.3 
24.7  29.8  5.2 
26.3  32.5  6.2 
28.1  35.3  7.2 
29.3  37.3  8.0 
30.6  39.9  9.3 
32.1  42.3  10.2 
33.2  44.5  11.3 
33.8  45.5  11.7 
33.6  45.7  12.2 
33.5  45.8  12.2 
Source:  Authors' calculations. 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmTable 4 
Lifetime Net Tax Rates for Generations Born since 1900: 
Baseline Case, Mandatory Caps on Entitlements, and Income Tax Surtax 
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Source:  Authors' calculations. 
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Percent 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Reports. 
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Age Group 
Sources:  Consumer Expenditure Surveys, 1972-73 and 1984-89; and National 
Income and Product Accounts. 
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Ratio to 40-Year-Old Males 
Age Group 
Sources:  Consumer Expenditure Surveys, 1972-73  and 1984-89; and National 
Income and Product Accounts. 
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PER HOUSEHOLD OF 35 TO 44 YEAR-OLD AGE GROUP 
1968  1970  1972  1974  1976  1978  1980  1982  1984 































http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmFIGURE 5: HOUSEHOLDS 65 AND OVER -- SHARE OF INCOME AND 
MAJOR COMPONENTS OF INCOME, AND RATIO OF PER 
HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND MAJOR COMPONENTS TO 35 TO 
44 YEAR-OLD AGE GROUP 
Group share of total (solid lines) 
Grour, Total per Household 
35-44 Total per Household  (dashed lines) 
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